

# **Breaking Through the Barriers of Systemic Corruption**

**Using Objectives Oriented Project  
Planning as a way to think through  
anti-corruption strategies**

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# Breaking through the Barriers of Systemic Corruption

## Using Objectives Oriented Project Planning techniques to think through anti-corruption strategies

### Background

In the work that the Partnership has been doing in Indonesia, it is regularly faced with the problem that Indonesia's corruption is systemic, that the system is seemingly impenetrable, and that it does not seem easy to identify ways into that system to try and subvert it<sup>1</sup>. Many suggestions for anti-corruption strategies are suggested from other countries' experience, or from anti-corruption theory, but they do not seem to be effective<sup>2</sup>. It seems important to find some way to design anti-corruption strategies that are (a) based on the Indonesian reality, and (b) can find a way to break through the seemingly impenetrable barrier of a closed system.

To illustrate what I mean, let me take the example of corrupt civil servants who steal the assets of the State for their own personal income. The huge income siphoned off by civil servants from illegal logging can serve as a model for such an inverted system.

If such a person is identified, it is very likely that:

- his or her behaviour is condoned (if not abetted) by his/her superior who receives a percentage of such income.
- It is also likely that the superior has helped to set up the system of corrupt behaviour by selling the civil servant the position that he/she now occupies, and thus (implicitly) requiring the civil servant to recoup on his/her investment by corrupt activities.
- Percentages of the illegal income very possibly are paid to senior people in the Department – the very people who would otherwise provide the political commitment to end corrupt practices.
- If a person is identified in corrupt practices, there is no incentive for the internal auditing department to deal with it because they frequently make their own income by taking bribes to ignore such cases.
- If a case is raised against such a person in the courts it is well known that the judges can be bought by the highest bidder.
- If a popular outcry is raised and demands made to the Parliament, experience suggests that Parliamentarians can also be bought, and that the Executive is experienced at agreeing reform, but then delaying and effectively neutralizing such reform.
- At the same time anti-corruption rhetoric is nationally transmitted, but the effective vehicles for fighting corruption are not put in place, or put in place but kept without funds or with ineffective legislation

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<sup>1</sup> "Subvert" : Robert Klitgaard, guru of anti-corruption activists, has moved in recent years, from "controlling corruption" to "subverting corruption" taking the analogy of breaking criminal cartels or the mafia.

<sup>2</sup> Indonesia is usefully compared, from the point of view of corruption with the countries of the former Soviet Union (FSU). Systemic corruption seems to be the case there as well. The World Bank has recently admitted that it's existing strategies to limit corruption in the FSU are not working well, and need to be revised

- Finally there are few examples of institutions which are not riddled with corrupt practices, and thus few models of how institutions can be run with integrity.

When faced with such a situation, what can an anti-corruption activist do? Our suggestion is there are ways through this barrier, but they must be based on

- (a) a clear headed examination of the realities of present day corruption
- (b) an ability to think beyond the present into the world that we would like to see without corruption, and
- (c) the ability to design projects that fit (a) and take account of (b).

The technique generally known as “Objectives Oriented Project Planning” provides us with a way to do this. This is very much “work in progress”: Many new points may be suggested by others, and all readers who are interested are asked to contribute. The following pages give examples of working through Problems, Objectives and Programs for “common denominator” issues, and then important governance institutions.

Many programs suggested as ways of limiting corruption start with models of a clean society or clean institutions and try and work back from those – fitting them into an Indonesian (or other) context<sup>3</sup>. In my opinion this is the wrong way to start. We need to start with the actual problems caused by corruption in Indonesia, look at the effects caused by these problems, look at what might take place given the context of Indonesia and finally try to work out programs that reflect both the problems and the future states that we would like to see.

Two things have helped me with such a process. The first is the series of exercises that have been supported by the Partnership over the last year which have identified the ways that corruption works in Indonesia. The second is the very valuable work of the ADB in its 2002 Indonesian Governance Assessment written by Staffan Synnerstrom and Owen Podger<sup>4</sup>. The first has clarified the insidious and pervasive way in which corruption works and its many enthusiastic adherents. The second carefully analyses the structures that support corruption which are not always easy to understand.

### **The Work of the Partnership**

The Partnership has produced 16 essays on different aspects of corrupt practices in Indonesia in its 4 volume book “Stealing from the Poor”. It has also produced a survey of perceptions and experience of corruption from Indonesian households, businesses, and civil servants. Furthermore it has produced a specific action research study of the effects of corruption on very poor urban slum dwellers, and their perceptions about corruption. It has assembled a high powered advisory team and asked their advice on entry points into pervasive corruption, and finally it has canvassed the opinions of over 600 people from every province in the country

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<sup>3</sup> For an example of this, please see the multi-pronged model used by the World Bank in the former Soviet Union countries, in Annex A.

<sup>4</sup> Still in draft

through a series of 6 regional workshops<sup>5</sup>, producing finally “An Action Plan for Fighting Corruption in Indonesia”<sup>6</sup>

### **The Work of the ADB**

The ADB has looked at the common factors of corrupt behaviour, particularly in the Government of Indonesia, and has found origins of corruption in failures to realize competent standards in Human Resource Management, Public Expenditure Management, and Management of the Regulatory Environment. It has then shown how limitations in all those aspects of management have permeated the problems of the usual sectors that determine good governance in a country, Indonesia included – the Justice sector, the Civil Service, the Business Sector, Parliament etc etc.

The ADB has not looked so closely at the attitudes and behaviour of Indonesians – at the norms and patterns of daily life, and at the ethical standards that are and are not applied. My work, therefore, adds to the ADB work by looking at corruption through four “common denominator” sectors:

- Human Resource Management
- Public Expenditure Management
- Management of the Regulatory Environment
- Attitudes and Behaviour

and then watching the ways that corruption evolves from these common denominators into specific problems in eight important governance institutions:

- Civil Service
- Justice
- Business
- Parliament
- Political parties
- Local Government and Decentralization
- Civil Society
- Public Audit Institutions

One of the analytical tools that I have found very useful is the World Bank’s division of corruption into State Capture and Administrative Corruption. State Capture results when corrupt people control the regulatory process and, from the top, make laws, policies and regulations that specifically benefit them. Administrative Corruption results from peoples’ ingenuity and venality as they distort existing laws, policies and regulations to benefit themselves.

### **The Effects of Corruption on Indonesia**

At the start of the booklet I provide an overall Problem Tree of the corruption situation in Indonesia, showing (from bottom to top) the common denominators, the governance sectors, state capture and administrative corruption, the core problem

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<sup>5</sup> A report on these workshops is available from the Partnership in English and Indonesian: “What Indonesia thinks can be done about KKN”

<sup>6</sup> Also available from the Partnership

and then the effects. Since any enthusiasm for fighting corruption in Indonesia will come from Indonesians concern about corruption's effects on their country, it is sensible to look more closely at these effects, particularly since the Partnership's research has shown that a number of people in the country are not so concerned with corruption, and in fact, benefit from it<sup>7</sup>.

All too often the effects of corruption are regarded at a macro-level. It is important that citizens see the direct influence on their lives of corruption. All too often the effect on foreign investment is flagged as the most serious effect of corruption on Indonesia. In fact the effect is much more personal and much more immediate.

Examples might be:

- A poor mother's child dies because the PUSKESMAS drugs have been corruptly taken by the doctor to use in his/her more expensive private practice
- A child cannot get into school because the parents cannot afford the corrupt demands of the teachers for special contributions to the school.
- A slum area which has suffered a fire cannot get help from the Municipality because the budget for emergencies has been corruptly taken to buy Councillors sedan cars
- There is no fishing and polluted rivers in forest areas because officials have corruptly sold logging licenses to businesses
- Social services (education, health, social welfare) are very limited because money for this has been corruptly siphoned off elsewhere into private hands
- Corrupt people continue to steal from the state and are not prosecuted or punished because they can bribe the courts.

## How to use this Book

The book is divided into two parts – the **Common Denominators** and the **Governance Institutions**. Within these two categories are three stages : **Problem Tress, Objectives Trees**, and **Program Ideas**.

### 1. Problem Trees

The Reader is invited to choose a Governance Institution that interests him or her, and look at the Problem Tree for that institution. The Problem Tree has a Core Problem box in the centre of the page with beneath that boxes for the Causes of the Core Problem and above it boxes for the Effects of the Core Problem. The boxes are linked logically from bottom to top, so that one box is the reason for the box above. The reader is invited to look at the boxes that make up these causes and effects, and add to them if wanted.

For each Governance Institution the reader is then invited to look at all the Common Denominators Problem Trees, since it is likely that the Common Denominators Problem Trees will have some insights into the problems of the specific Governance Institution.

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<sup>7</sup> See Annex 2

## 2. Objectives Trees

After the reader has understood the Problems, it is time to look at the Objectives. The Objectives Trees are simply the opposite of the Problem Trees. Each box does not state a problem but a desired future situation – Reasons leading to the Main Objective, leading to Results. The reader is invited to move from the Problem Tree of a Governance Institution into the Objectives Tree to understand how Problems can be changed into desired future situation or Objectives. He/she should look at the boxes that make up these Reasons and Results, and add to them if wanted.

## 3. Program Ideas

After the Reader has understood the Problems and the Objectives of a particular Governance Institution, it is time to look at practical Program Ideas which will give us a way to break through the barriers of systemic corruption. The reader should look at the Program Ideas which consist of three columns (Objectives, Indicators of Success, and Assumptions) and three rows (Goal, Purpose, and Outputs or Programs). Let us look at these more closely:

Objectives – these have been selected from the many boxes in the Objectives Tree, and are arranged logically from the most detailed (Outputs/programs) to the most general (Goal). They state what you want to achieve. If the readers have other ideas, please work them out using this format.

Indicators of Success – this column states what result you would expect to see if the objective was accomplished. It helps you to be concrete in your ideas.

Assumptions – this column suggests what others have to do before you can achieve your objectives, since you do not control everything. This column also makes you realize how difficult some of your objectives will be to achieve, since others may control factors important to your program

The Program Ideas zero in on a set of problems, and is inspired by what might be possible. At this stage it answers “What might be done” without saying “How this might be done”. Very importantly it also poses the Assumptions that we have to make if we think that there is a chance of achieving such objectives in these programs. The realistic examination of assumptions is sobering – as we see again the complexity and the inter-connectness of corruption in Indonesia.

These Program Ideas are a start to help you develop specific programs to fight corruption. It may well be that you need more detailed planning – but you can use this format to help you with this process.

Those familiar with the methodology will know it as GOPP (Goal Oriented Project Planning) or ZOPP (Ziel Orientiert Projekt Planung). It leaves the reader with the opportunity of focusing on a program that fits the comparative advantage of his/her organization and further refining the Outputs and the Inputs that are the next stage of the process.

Hopefully, this booklet will allow the reader to move beyond the difficulties inherent in the complex, inter-twined, pervasive nature of corruption in Indonesia, to get a handle on more specific program possibilities which have, in turn, surfaced from the consideration of real problems.

## **Sources**


The sources from which the problems have been identified are:

- The four books of “Stealing from the People” edited by the Aksara Foundation
- “The National Corruption Survey” produced by the Partnership with INSIGHT
- “The Poor Speak Out” produced by the Partnership and the World Bank, Indonesia
- “Participatory Corruption Appraisal” by the Partnership and the World Bank in Indonesia
- “Country Governance Assessment Report” produced by the Asian Development Bank, Indonesia (still in draft)
- The 6 regional Anti-KKN Workshops organized by the Partnership
- The work of the Partnerships Select Steering Committee from the Anti-KKN Program of the Partnership


## Acronyms and Abbreviations

ABPD	District Budget
ADB	Asian Development Bank
AGO	Attorney General's Office
Anti-KKN	the work against corruption in Indonesia
AusAID	Austalian bilateral assistance
BAWASDA	Badan Waspada Daerah – the Kabupaten level auditing body
BKN	Badan Kesejahteraan Nasional
BPK	Badan Pemeriksaan Keuangan (Indonesian) State Audit Bureau
BPKP	Badan Pemeriksaan Keuangan dan Pembangunan (Indonesian) Financial and Devevelopment Supervisory Board
BUMN	Badan Usaha Milik Negara (Indonesian) State Owned Enterprises
Bupati	Head of a District (Kabupaten)
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DPR	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (Indonesian) National Parliament
DPRD	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (Indonesian) Regional Parliament
FCGI	Forum for Corporate Governance in Indonesia
GOI	Government of Indonesia
GONGOs	Government owned NGOs
GTZ	German Technical Assistance
IBRA	Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency
IrJen	lit Inspektorat Jendral (Inspector General) – the in-house auditing body for any government department
KKN	Korupsi, Kolusi dan Nepotisme (Indonesian) Corruption, Collusion, Nepotism – the cry of Reformasi referred to in the Parliamentary Stipulation of 1998
LAN	Lembaga Administrasi Negara
MENPAN	Menteri Pemberdayaan Aparatur Negara
MoF	Ministry of Finance
MPR	Majlis Perwakilan Rakyat (Indonesian) Supreme Peoples Assembly
MPs	Members of parliament
Orde Baru	The Suharto Period (lit. New order)
Pemda	Pemerintah Daerah
SOE	State Owned Enterprise
TCP3	Bill originating from Parliament to encourage public participation in discussion of new bills
Uncivil NGOs	NGOs which operate in destructive and non-developmental ways e.g. religious extremist NGOs
WB	World Bank

# The Problem Tree of Corruption in Indonesia



# The Objective Tree of Corruption in Indonesia




## **Part 1A: The Problem Trees for the Common Denominators**

- **Human Resource Management**
- **Public Expenditure Management**
- **Management of the Regulatory Environment**
- **Attitudes and Behaviour**


# The Problem Tree of Human Resource Management

(see P. 28 for Objectives Tree and P. 42 for Program Ideas)


## Effects



## Core Problem




## Causes



# Problem Tree for Public Expenditure Management


(see P. 29 for Objectives Tree and P. 43 for Program Ideas)

## Effects




## Core Problem

**SYSTEMATIC AND WHOLESALE USE OF CORRUPT PRACTICES IN INDONESIA**



## Causes




# Problem Tree for the Management of the Regulatory Environment


(see P. 30 for Objectives Tree and P. 44 for Program Ideas)

NB: LPR = Laws/Policies/Regulations


## Effects



## Core Problems




## Causes




# Problem Tree for Attitudes and Behaviour

(see P. 31 for Objectives Tree and P. 45 for Program Ideas)


## Effects



## Core Problem



## Causes




## **Part 1B : The Problem Trees for the Governance Institutions**

- **The Civil Service**
- **The Justice Sector**
- **Private Business**
- **Parliament**
- **Political Parties**
- **Local Government**
- **Civil Society**
- **Public Audit Institutions**


# Problem Tree for Civil Service

(see P. 33 for Objectives Tree and P. 47 for Program Ideas)


## Effects



## Core Problem




## Cause




# Problem Tree for the Justice Sector

(see P. 34 for Objectives Tree and P. 48 for Program Ideas)


**Effect**



**Core Problem**




**Cause**




# Problem Tree of Private Business

(see P. 35 for Objectives Tree and P. 49 for Program Ideas)


## Effects



## Core Problem



## Cause



# Problem Tree for Parliament


(see P. 36 for Objectives Tree and P. 50 for Program Ideas)

## Effects




## Core Problem

**SYSTEMATIC AND WHOLESAL USE OF CORRUPT PRACTICES IN INDONESIA**



## Cause




# Problem Tree for Political Parties

(see P. 37 for Objectives Tree and P. 51 for Program Ideas)


## Effects



## Core Problem




## Cause



# Problem Tree for Local Government


(see P. 38 for Objectives Tree and P. 52 for Program Ideas)

## Effects




## Core Problems

### SYSTEMATIC AND WHOLESALE USE OF CORRUPT PRACTICES IN INDONESIA




## Causes




# Problem Tree of Civil Society

(see P. 39 for Objectives Tree and P. 53 for Program Ideas)



# Problem Tree of Public Audit Institutions

(see P. 40 for Objectives Tree and P. 54 for Program Ideas)




## **Part 2: The Objective Trees for the Common Denominators:**

- **Human Resource Management**
- **Public Expenditure Management**
- **Management of the Regulatory Environment**
- **Attitudes and Behaviour**

# The Objectives Tree of Human Resource Management


(see P. 14 for Problem Tree and P. 42 for Program Ideas)



# The Objective Tree for Public Expenditure Management


(see P. 15 for Problem Tree and P. 43 for Program Ideas)

## Results




## Main Objective

**Corrupt practices are rare in Indonesian governance**



## Causes




# The Objective Tree for the Management of the Regulatory Environment


(see P. 16 for Problem Tree and P. 44 for Program Ideas)

(NB: LPR = Laws, Policies, Regulations)


## Results



## Core Problems




## Causes



# The Objective Tree for Attitudes and Behaviour

(see P. 17 for Problem Tree and P. 45 for Program Ideas)




## **Part 2B: The Objectives Trees for the Governance Sectors:**

- **The Civil Service**
- **The Justice Sector**
- **Private Business**
- **Parliament**
- **Political Parties**
- **Local Government**
- **Civil Society**
- **Public Audit Institutions**


# Objectives Tree for Civil Service

(see P. 19 for Problem Tree and P. 47 for Program Ideas)


## Results



## Main Objective




## Reasons




# Objectives Tree for the Justice Sector

(see P. 20 for Problem Tree and P. 48 for Program Ideas)


## Results



## Main Objective




## Reasons




# Objectives Tree of Private Business

(see P. 21 for Problem Tree and P. 49 for Program Ideas)


## Results



## Main Objectives




## Reasons




# Objectives Tree for Parliament

(see P. 22 for Problem Tree and P. 50 for Program Ideas)


## Results



## Main Objective




## Reasons



# Objectives Tree for Political Parties

(see P. 23 for Problem Tree and P. 51 for Program Ideas)

## Results




## Main Objective

**Corrupt practices are rare in Indonesian governance**

**Political Parties**  
Individuals and businesses give willingly to political parties at their own decision and under clear rules of disclosure. Political parties do not extort funds.

Internal reform possibilities  
Political parties seek reform of their governance structures  
External Reform Possibilities  
Donors support electoral reform


## Reasons



# Objectives Tree for Local Government

(see P. 24 for Problem Tree and P. 52 for Program Ideas)


## Results



## Main Objective




## Causes



# Objectives Tree of Civil Society


(see P. 25 for Problem Tree and P. 53 for Program Ideas)

## Results




## Main Objective

**Corrupt practices are rare in Indonesian governance**




## Reasons




# Objective Tree of Public Audit Institutions

(see P. 26 for Problem Tree and P. 54 for Program Ideas)


## Results



## Main Objective



## Reasons



## **Part 3: Program Ideas, Strategies and Assumptions**

- **Human Resource Management**
- **Public Expenditure Management**
- **Management of the Regulatory Environment**
- **Attitudes and Behaviour**

# Program Ideas

## Human Resource Management Reform

(see P. 14 for Problem Tree and P. 28 for Objective Tree)

**Strategy:** to improve the professionalism of the civil service by applying human resource management (HRM) principles and practices

### Objectives/Results/Assumptions

Objective	Indicator of Success	Assumptions
<b>Goal</b> Corrupt practices are rare in Indonesian governance		Civil servants are paid comparable wages to the private sector
<b>Purpose</b> To produce a civil service tailored to its needed functions and remunerated and staffed in accordance with HRM principles	A productive and cost effective civil service with high morale	Indonesia can handle the political implications of downsizing the civil service considerably
<b>Outputs/Program</b> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Regional governments ascertain what and how many civil servants they need and enforce this quota</li> <li>2. Revise the echelon system so that structure and position follow function and need</li> <li>3. Civil servant training is re-worked to emphasise relevance to tasks that need to be done</li> <li>4. Civil service induction specifically addresses corruption and a code of ethics</li> <li>5. Entry exams into the civil service are supervised to eradicate bribes</li> <li>6. Buying/selling of civil service positions is terminated</li> </ol>	Regions have a civil service they can afford and which is tailored to their requirements  Civil servants work within a system geared to efficiency and productivity  All civil servants have the training that they need for the job that they have to do  Civil servants are clear what are the boundaries of accepted behaviour  Civil servants know that they and their peers have got their positions competitively The civil service gets higher quality entrants  Civil servants are not beholden too patrons nor forced to undertake corrupt practices to re-coup their investment	There is not a prohibitive political backlash  There is not a prohibitive political backlash  Sufficient trainers for such new thinking exist  Policing of infractions to the code of ethics is strongly implemented  Supervisory mechanisms are put in place  There is not a prohibitory political backlash

# Program Ideas

## Public Expenditure Management Reform

(see P. 15 for Problem Tree and P. 29 for Objective Tree)

**Strategy:** to establish stronger public expenditure LPR and to make sure they are supervised (including public oversight)

### Objectives/Results/Assumptions

Objective	Indicator of Success	Assumptions
<p><b>Goal</b> Corrupt practices are rare in Indonesian governance</p>		Those who design, implement, and supervise LPR for public expenditure management are not themselves corrupt
<p><b>Purpose</b> To make sure that GOI budgets and expenditures are adequately supervised, publicly accessible, and limit opportunities for corrupt behaviour</p>	All GOI planned expenditures is agreed in one unified budget The public have a voice in examining the budget	DPR and GOI will agree to effectively cancel off-budget finance and open up the budgeting process to the public
<p><b>Outputs/Program</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Research and publicize the size and extent of the unofficial budget</li> <li>2. GOI produces and DPR examines one unified budget</li> <li>3. Set up a Public Accounts Committee in the DPR/DPRDs</li> <li>4. Establish better procurement rules and regulations and a monitoring body to supervise their application</li> <li>5. The civil service manages projects efficiently with minimum required supervisory staff and honest estimates</li> <li>6. SOE managers make their enterprises profitable</li> </ol>	<p>The country knows the extent of the unofficial budget and the shortfall that has to be made up</p> <p>One budget agreed by DPR/DPRDs</p> <p>Public accounts committees oversee GOI budgeting and accounting in the DPR and DPRDs</p> <p>Tenders are offered, bids received, and contractors chosen with integrity and honesty</p> <p>Programs achieve their objectives efficiently and cost effectively</p> <p>SOEs provide income to the state either by profits or by sale to investors</p>	<p>GOI departments will reveal their secrets</p> <p>DPR and GOI are convinced that this is in Indonesia's best interests</p> <p>DPR/DPRDs see this is in their own best interests The skills are available to staff it</p> <p>Vested interests do not derail the process</p> <p>Those presently benefiting from "projectization" (i.e. pimpros) do not derail the process</p> <p>Those using SOEs as cash cows do not derail the process</p>

# Program Ideas

## Reform in the Management of the Regulatory Environment

(see P. 16 for Problem Tree and P. 30 for Objective Tree)

**Strategy:** to improve the design, management, and supervision of the laws, policies and regulations through greater management skills and public participation

### Objectives/Results/Assumptions

Objective	Indicator of Success	Assumptions
<b>Goal</b> Corrupt practices are rare in Indonesian governance		Reforms can be agreed, passed and implemented
<b>Purpose</b> To improve the design, management and supervision of the process of making laws, policies, and regulations	Laws, policies and regulations which have been thought through and checked at many levels for likely success	GOI sees the value to Indonesia of such improvements and can overcome the venality and greed of corrupt individuals
<b>Outputs/Program</b> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Publicize the costs of the existing and agreed taxes and levies</li> <li>2. Set up a system to examine the budgetary and legal implications of new LPR before drafting and passing them into law</li> <li>3. Set up a system to examine the corruption possibilities of new LPRs before drafting/passing them</li> <li>4. Set up a system for the public to be involved in discussion of new LPRs (TCP3)</li> <li>5. Set up a system to research and expose the corruption practices of existing LPRs</li> <li>6. Rework existing LPRs that are venal and against the public good</li> </ol>	<p>The public only pay what they are legally obliged to pay</p> <p>Only feasible LPRs will be agreed</p> <p>Opportunities for corruption in new LPR are minimized</p> <p>New LPRs will address public concerns</p> <p>The extent of state capture will be well known</p> <p>Counter productive LPRs abolished or re-worked</p>	<p>“Gatekeepers” are supervised to ensure that they indeed charge these costs</p> <p>Systems to so examine will include a wide range of stakeholders</p> <p>Vested interests do not derail the process</p> <p>Systems to so examine will include a wide range of stakeholders</p> <p>Relevant stakeholders from the public can be identified</p> <p>Researchers can be found</p> <p>Vested interests will not de-rail such a process</p>

# Program Ideas

## Attitudes and Behaviour Reform

(see P. 17 for Problem Tree and P. 31 for Objective Tree)

**Strategy:** to change Indonesian peoples attitudes and behaviour in respect of corruption so that they value and practice integrity, accountability, and transparency

### Objectives/Results/Assumptions

Objective	Indicator of Success	Assumptions
<b>Goal</b> Corrupt practices are rare in Indonesian governance		Indonesians conditioned by 32 years of promoting corruption can now change their behaviour
<b>Purpose</b> To persuade Indonesian citizens to change their attitudes and behaviour in respect of corrupt practices	Indonesians rarely act corruptly	Enough Indonesians are seriously worried about the destructive effects of corruption
<b>Outputs/Program</b> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Corruption cases are publicized by the media who also campaign for their prosecution</li> <li>2. The media systematically educate the public about the destructive effect of corruption, and what they can do about it.</li> <li>3. Strong political leadership energizes an anti-corruption spirit</li> <li>4. GOI prosecutes big fish</li> <li>5. Pass whistle blower protection laws</li> <li>6. National religious leaders promote the fight against corruption</li> <li>7. More people refuse to pay illegal levies and publicize their stance</li> <li>8. Both formal and informal educational materials about corruption are produced and used</li> <li>9. Clear manuals illustrating good governance and bad governance produced for key sectors</li> </ol>	<p>The public is well aware of the extent and depth of corruption</p> <p>The public is aware of the destructive effects of corruption and what they can do about it.</p> <p>A national focus on fighting corruption is created</p> <p>People believe no-one is immune</p> <p>The public will reveal corrupt practices</p> <p>Indonesians feel a religion sanctioned reason to fight corruption</p> <p>The public feel they they can join a popular movement against corruption</p> <p>The public has reference material to refer back to.</p> <p>Clarity and reference materials exist</p>	<p>Media people are not physically attacked for doing this</p> <p>Media people are not attacked</p> <p>Political leaders consider this is in their own interests</p> <p>Vested interests do not de-rail this process. Judges and prosecutors can be found who will work with integrity and according to the law</p> <p>Culture of secrecy in GOI will allow this to happen</p> <p>National religious leaders command sufficient respect</p> <p>Such people are not attacked</p> <p>Writers can be found to produce such works</p> <p>These will be used</p>

## **Stage 3: Strategies, Program Ideas and Assumptions for the Governance Sectors**

- **The Civil Service**
- **The Justice Sector**
- **Private Business**
- **Parliament**
- **Political Parties**
- **Local Government**
- **Civil Society**
- **Public Audit Institutions**

# Program Ideas

## Civil Service Reform

(see P. 19 for Problem Tree and P. 33 for Objective Tree)

**STRATEGY:** to work with reform minded people in the GOI, in selected ministries or departments who seriously and enthusiastically seek to reform the civil service

### Objectives/Results/Assumptions

OBJECTIVES	RESULTS	ASSUMPTIONS
<b>Goal</b>		
Corrupt practices are rare in Indonesian governance		Islands of integrity can be developed
<b>Purpose</b>		
To make sure that civil service salary structures, administration, and management practices in selected GOI ministries systematically encourage integrity	Selected ministries or departments are operating with a low level of corruption	Selected reform minded agencies can be identified who want to carry out this program  The selected ministry is not involved in illegal off-budget income and expenditure
<b>Outputs/Programs</b>		
1. Provide adequate basic salaries	Civil servants salaries are at parity with the private sector	The national budget will allow for this
2. Clear information about entitlements given to civil servants and such entitlements observed	Civil servants entitlements are at parity with the private sector	The national budget will allow for this
3. Managers employ objectives, professional and meritocratic staff practices	The best people are recruited, employed, evaluated and promoted	Managers are aware of the nature of such practices
4. Corrupt people are caught, exposed, prosecuted and punished	Widespread belief amongst employees that corrupt people will not be tolerated	The prosecution services perform their task with integrity
5. Whistle blowers are protected	Those revealing corrupt practices are rewarded	The selected Ministry can offer such protection from malefactors
6. Fees collected are in line with legal and published tariffs	Legal fees are posted and observed	This can be monitored

# Program Ideas

## Judicial Sector Reform

(see P. 20 for Problem Tree and P. 34 for Objective Tree)

**STRATEGY:** to improve the legal understanding of corruption and the agencies resources of the justice sector such that they clean their own house and prosecute others

### Objectives/Results/Assumptions

OBJECTIVES	RESULTS	ASSUMPTIONS
<b>Goal</b>		
Corrupt practices are rare in Indonesian governance	The three parts of the justice sector have integrity and prosecute corruption cases fairly	Present incumbents of the three services can be persuaded to change
<b>Purpose</b>		
To free the three agencies of the Justice sector from corrupt practices, and to get more corruption cases (including big fish) prosecuted in accordance with the law and punished	Prosecution and punishment of important corruption cases and increase of public confidence in the justice sector.	Present incumbents of the three services can be persuaded to change The MoF can replace the funds that are presently acquired through extortion
<b>Outputs/Programs</b>		
1. Clear legal definitions of corruption agreed and clear jurisdictions as to who prosecutes what	All understand the legal meaning of corruption and who is responsible for prosecuting it.	The DPR is prepared to work on this
2. The AGO and the Judiciary prosecute and punish high profile corruption cases, including civil servants	Notoriously corrupt people seen to be punished People believe that the GOI is serious about punishing corruption	Political interference can be avoided
3. The Police are clear about their role in fighting corruption and have sufficient financial and human resources to carry it out.	The police bring many corrupt actors to court.	The MoF has sufficient funds to replace the off-budget funds of the police from extortion. The Police have competitive examinations without sales of jobs
4. Oversight structures exist for Judiciary, Police, and AGO governance to deal with improper practices	The public is clear to whom it can complain about corruption in the justice sector	The three agencies agree to this
5. The AGO are clear about their role in fighting corruption and have sufficient financial & human resources to carry it out	The AGO bring many important corrupt cases to court	The MoF has sufficient funds to replace the off-budget funds of the AGO from extortion
6. Judges are paid a competitive salary and punished for corruption	Judges do not extort from plaintiffs	The MoF will provide the funding
7. Judgements from the courts are recorded and published, including minority decisions	Miscarriages of justice can be identified	The staff and resources exist to do this

# Program Ideas

## Private Business Sector Reform

*(see P. 21 for Problem Tree and P. 35 for Objective Tree)*

**STRATEGY:** to seek to introduce legal ordinances which will protect workers, partners, customers and creditors from crooked business owners/managers and protect business owners/managers from GOI and political party interference in their work

### Objectives/Results/Assumptions

OBJECTIVES	INDICATORS OF SUCCESS	ASSUMPTIONS
<b>Goal</b>		
Corrupt practices are rare in Indonesian governance		Laws can be passed and implemented
<b>Purpose</b>		
To make sure that strong regulation of business is enforced and monitored and activities within these regulations are implemented	Businesses are allowed to pursue profits and customer satisfaction  Other stakeholders are protected from malfeasance	Businesses really want a level playing field  The Courts will fairly prosecute crooked companies
Outputs/Programs		
1. Banks, firms, cooperatives, SOEs are protected from GOI or political interference  2. All previous owners of businesses now owned by IBRA are held to account for their past crimes  3. SOEs are put on a business like footing or privatized  4. Requirements for information disclosure are clearly spelt out, observed and monitored  5. Businesses pay their due taxes	Private Sector businesses are allowed to pursue profits  Stolen money is returned to the nation and guilty people punished  SOEs are profitable or sold  Stakeholders receive clear and timely financial statements  Government tax revenues from Indonesian businesses increases substantially	Banks, firms, cooperatives and SOEs really want a level playing field  IBRA applies the law and is not prevented from doing so by politicians or corporate bribes  The GOI agencies which use SOEs as cash cows will allow this to happen  There are responsible bodies that will monitor and sanction where necessary  The tax office operates legally and without extortion

# Program Ideas

## Parliament Reform

(see P. 22 for Problem Tree and P. 36 for Objective Tree)

**Strategy:** to persuade Parliamentarians of the harmful impact of present corrupt behaviour in the DPR and DPRD such that they reform themselves

### Objectives/Results/Assumptions

Objective	Indicator of Success	Assumptions
<b>Goal</b> Corrupt practices are rare in Indonesian governance		Parliament is inclined to clean itself up
<b>Purpose</b> To stop the corrupt practices inside Parliament (esp money politics) and make them an oversight body for others' corruption	Honest parliamentarians providing oversight for GOI practices	Parliamentary representatives can wean themselves from the bribes they presently receive, and can be replaced if they do not
<b>Outputs/Program</b> 1. Introduce binding codes of ethics into DPR and DPRD  2. All benefits to Parliamentarians have to be approved by a public oversight group  3. Payments to MPs for agreeing candidates, agreeing votes, and passing bills are outlawed and perpetrators punished (money politics)	Parliamentarians operating within an agreed code of ethics  MPs receive wages and benefits accepted by the people and have the peoples respect  MPs do the job they are paid to do by the state, and corrupt politicians are replaced	There is a supervisory body which will sanction infractions  Such a group can be formed  The Public is prepared not to vote for them again

# Program Ideas

## Political Party Reform

*(see P. 23 for Problem Tree and P. 37 for Objective Tree)*

**STRATEGY:** to bring political parties within a legal and regulatory environment

### Objectives/Results/Assumptions

OBJECTIVES	RESULTS	ASSUMPTIONS
<b>Goal</b>		
Corrupt practices are rare in Indonesian governance	Political parties subscribe to ethical codes and are held to them	Political parties see that a reputation for integrity will win votes in a free and fair election
<b>Purpose</b>		
To develop a system in which funds are freely given by individuals and businesses to political parties without extortion	Full disclosure of all political party financing	Political parties believe they will get enough to exist without extortion
<b>Outputs/Programs</b>		
1. Set up an auditing structure for political parties to use	All political parties audits are publicly available	The auditors will have an independent source of funding and no conflict of interest
2. Set up an agreed set of ethical principles and practice for the running of a political party with clear sanctions for breaking them	The "rules of the game" in respect of political parties are clear.	The political parties will accept the jurisdiction of the courts The political parties see the advantage to themselves in such a practice
3. The constituency elect an individual to represent them who they can hold accountable for corrupt practices	The electorate know to whom they can complain in cases of corruption	The DPR/MPR are prepared to reform the present electoral system

# Program Ideas

## Local Government Reform

(see P. 24 for Problem Tree and P. 38 for Objective Tree)

**Strategy:** to involve citizens organisations in oversight functions in order to reduce corruption in local governments

### Objectives/Results/Assumptions

Objective	Indicator of Success	Assumptions
<b>Goal</b> Corrupt practices are rare in Indonesian governance		Decentralization is seen by the public and local leaders as more than an opportunity for venal opportunities
<b>Purpose</b> To involve local people in framing the policies and practices of local governance thus reducing inherited GOI corruption plus new corruption	Regular citizens oversight committees operating effectively	Vested interests do not de-rail such an idea
<b>Outputs/Program</b> 1. Local government researches existing corruption, publicizes and sanctions it  2. The APBD is discussed in draft with citizens groups  3. The DPRD sets up a structure to assess legal, budgetary and corruption implications of all new legislation  4. DPRD regularly provide oversight to Pemda  5. Citizens set up "watch" organizations to monitor APBD, DPRD, and Pemda activities, and these are linked to the media, and they can compare between districts	Existing corruption practices are exposed and stopped  Citizens have input into shaping the APBD  The DPRD knows the likelihood of new legislation being effective  DPRD monitor and prevent Pemda excesses  Watchdog organizations keep issues in front of the peoples' eyes	Vested interests do not de-rail such ideas  Citizens are able to understand the APBD  Vested interests do not de-rail such ideas  This is allowed in revisions to 22.25/99 DPRD do not themselves collude in Pemda excesses  Quality committee citizens can be found and are not scared away by vested interests

# Program Ideas

## Civil Society Organisations and Reform

*(see P. 25 for Problem Tree and P. 39 for Objective Tree)*

**STRATEGY:** to improve the policy environment in which anti-corruption CSOs work and help them to extend their work widely and deeply

### Objectives/Results/Assumptions

OBJECTIVES	RESULTS	ASSUMPTIONS
<b>Goal</b>		
Corrupt practices are rare in Indonesian governance	CSOs practice good governance themselves and monitor the good governance practices of other sectors.	The CSOs which are interested in monitoring good governance practices can agree between them on standards.
<b>Purpose</b>		
To encourage the growth, quality, expansion and reach of anti-corruption CSOs, and to separate them from corrupt CSOs	Good quality CSOs “watching” all governance sectors.	Anti-corruption CSOs can agree on a code of ethics and common standards for themselves
<b>Outputs/Programs</b>		
1. Most CSOs in Indonesia have a public position on corruption	Public statements of CSOs	CSOs with other interests can be persuaded of the importance of corruption
2. CSOs work in partnership with GOI to fight corruption	CSOs receive GOI funds and other resources to fight corruption	The GOI is persuaded that anti-corruption CSOs are politically helpful to them
3. CSOs work in partnership with citizens organisations and businesses to fight corruption	CSOs receive business or citizen’s funds or other resources to fight corruption	Citizens and Businesses are persuaded that anti-corruption CSOs are useful to them
3. Anti-corruption CSOs have clear legal persona, and competent strategies and programs	Anti-corruption CSOs receive support for their programs	Anti-corruption CSOs are prepared to work within the legal and planning environment, and to subscribe to common codes of ethics
4. CSOs are “watching” all areas of poor governance	Every working group on good governance has CSO representatives	Depts of GOI and the Business sector are prepared to give CSOs space at the table

# Program Ideas

## Public Audit Institutions Reform

(see P. 26 for Problem Tree and P. 40 for Objective Tree)

**STRATEGY:** to work with BPK, BPKP, IrJen, and Badan Pengawasan Daerah so that each is able and committed to do the job they are meant to do

### Objectives/Results/Assumptions

OBJECTIVES	RESULTS	ASSUMPTIONS
<b>Goal</b>		
Corrupt practices are rare in Indonesian governance		Public audit institutions are professional and have integrity
<b>Purpose</b>		
To make sure that public audit institutions have sufficient funds and sufficient trained staff for all kinds of audits, including investigative audits	Audits show up findings about corruption	Auditors in these bodies are themselves not corrupt  Audit institutions are prepared to show no favours
<b>Outputs/Programs</b>		
1. BPK with sufficient funds and trained staff to carry out its mandate of being a Supreme Audit Authority	Compliance and investigative audits carried out as desired and customers not charged for this service	BPKP is prepared to transfer some staff and funds to BPK. The DPRD is prepared to increase the budget of BPK
2. The DPR receives, debates, and takes action on BPK's regular reports on the corruption revealed in its audits of government offices	Cases brought up by the BPK are prosecuted	The Attorney General's office takes direction from the DPR and investigates cases at its request
3. BPKP has sufficient funds to be the internal auditor for the GOI	BPKP does not have to charge clients for its services	The MoF is prepared to increase the budget of BPKP
4. The GOI responds to BPKP findings about corruption	Cases brought up by BPKP are prosecuted	The GOI is prepared to let civil servants identified by BPKP for corruption be prosecuted.
5. IrJen seriously investigate corruption cases in their respective ministries	Cases brought up by the IrJen are prosecuted	The GOI is prepared to let civil servants identified by IrJen for corruption be prosecuted.
6. Badan Pengawasan Daerah (BPD) audits local government offices effectively	Cases brought up by the BPD are prosecuted	Local government offices accept the role of the BPD and allow them access to all accounts and records.

## Annex 1: The Multi Pronged Strategy

Observers have compared Indonesia's corruption with the corruption observed in countries in transition from the former Soviet Union (FSU). In such places strong central control has been replaced by the instruments of democracy (political parties in competition, decentralization of power to local governments, a free press), but there is a strong legacy of the previous system and structures that distorts the democratic intentions. An analytical tool from those studying the FSU is the division of corruption into two – State Capture and Administrative Corruption. This tool is very relevant to Indonesia.

**State Capture:** *“the actions of individuals, groups, or firms both in the public and private sectors to influence the formation of laws, regulations, decrees and other government policies to their own advantage as a result of the illicit or non-transparent provision of private benefits to public officials”.*

Thus an individual, group or firm is able to bribe the legislature, the executive or the judiciary to issue a regulation, or ruling that advantages them. Soeharto ruled that all logging companies had to pay a percentage of their income to the Forestry Council which was, in effect, income for him. Presently would be Governors and Bupatis pay substantial amounts to DPRD's to agree their candidature so that they can receive the illicit income that goes with the job.

**Administrative Corruption:** *“the intentional imposition of distortions in the prescribed implementation of existing laws, rules, and regulations to provide advantage to either state or non-state actors as a result of the illicit and non-transparent provision of private gains to public officials”.*

Thus the Police now as in *Orde Baru* claim protection money from shop-keepers, under the excuse of contributions to local security funds.


The advised strategies for FSU countries has been a multi-pronged approach whereby the following measures are put into place:

- Political Accountability
- Competitive Private Sector
- Public Sector Management
- Civil Society Participation
- Institutional Restraints

These “prongs” are often shown in the form of the diagram on the following page:

Many of the “prongs” are relevant for Indonesia, and have been largely agreed in principle by the GOI - but many of them face a particular Indonesian situation or response which blocks their implementation. In many cases the reform has been agreed in principle, but distortions occur in its implementation: this is sometimes intentional as when national or local vested interests try to capture legislation or policies, and sometimes because there has been insufficient foresight or thinking through of the effects of policies or legislation.

## Multi-Pronged Strategy: Addressing State Capture and Administrative Corruption



Source: "Anti-corruption in Transition – a contribution to the policy debate" by the World BANK, 1999 (and reprinted many times elsewhere)

Let us take three examples of reform that, in theory, would diminish the incidence of corruption if implemented, but which have become distorted in Indonesia such that some other way of working is needed. They are:

- "Role for media NGOs"
- "Political competition with credible political parties"
- "Decentralization with Accountability"

**Role for media NGOs:** Indonesia now, post *Reformasi*, has a free press which frequently exposes cases of corruption. This does not, however, result in a diminution of corruption for the following reasons:

- Prosecution does not follow exposes, therefore after a period of excitement things return to status quo ante
- Exposes are limited to particular cases: the press does not look at systemic corruption, not suggest how readers can get involved in reform
- The media, even the Media NGOs, are bribable and are quite willing to take private or public money to praise or vilify. The commercial media is largely controlled by newspaper and TV station owners who are in turn linked to political power groups, and who make sure that exposes are of their political enemies, not friends.

**Political competition with credible political parties:** Indonesian now, post *Reformasi*, has political parties and has had a free and fair election in 1999. This has not resulted in a diminution of corruption either – and for the following reasons

- The electorate do not have a representative for whom they voted and to whom they can voice their complaints. They only voted for a party, and were given a party member who does not necessarily have any links to his/her constituency
- The political parties do not issue any manifesto or announce their support for any specific policy
- Regulations were announced for the financing of electoral campaigns, but were never observed, or audits published.
- Regulations for declaration of assets of civil servants were promulgated, but the body responsible has no power to prosecute those whose assets suggest corruption
- Elected members of political parties have swiftly become the target for bribery by both the Executive arm of government and by businesses – in both cases to get their plans approved by national or district Parliaments.

**Decentralization with Accountability:** Indonesia has enacted a massive decentralization exercise which, it was hoped, would give more voice to the people in the regions and contrast to the centrist top down policies of the Orde Baru. This has had the following negative effects:

- The local legislature (DPRD) only have limited authority to supervise or check the work of the local executive, limited to voting for or against an annual accountability speech. In many cases the executive bribes the local legislature to approve it.
- Locally powerful people or firms have bought the loyalty of both the local executive and legislature
- A substantial part of the government machinery is inherited from the center and is still controlled from the center
- The people do not have the right to discuss bills before they are made law, or the right to give their opinion on the budget.

This all suggests that we need a more specific approach that is built up from the Indonesian reality. There are a specifically Indonesian set of problems built up from both intentional blocking of reforms (though often with the appearance of supporting them) and historical or traditional structures that cannot easily accommodate reform, even if it was sincerely desired.

## **Annex 2: The Effects of Corruption on Indonesians and Indonesia**

### **Loss of Financial Capital**

A substantial part of Indonesia's wealth has already been stolen by corrupt people – principally by Suharto's family and by those who stole the BLBI funds. Because of this Indonesia does not have the money that it needs for the services it should offer to its people – health, education, welfare. Indonesia is therefore borrowing heavily from foreign sources and putting its citizens into debt for at least the two following generations.

The theft of state resources did not finish with Krismon, however, it still continues apace with huge amounts being presented as bribes to government officials, businessmen and parliamentarians.

One important part of the financial cost of corruption is that it takes away from the much needed legitimate revenue of the country from tax. Corrupt tax officials make sure that tax money comes to them, rather than the state.

The money that is needed for Indonesia to make money i.e. foreign investment into Indonesia - stays away because of the overall climate of financial impropriety and corrupt practices.

At an individual level, of course, corruption further impoverishes the poor – taking away from them the small amount of money they have.

### **Loss of Social Capital**

Social capital is the network of relationships and trust that allows a country to continue to operate. To some extent it is the expectation that the institutions of the state will do what they are meant to do – to some extent it is the expectation that your neighbour or community member will be a resource for you.

In Indonesia the Justice system is already perverted. The people do not trust it at all and recognize that justice is a bought and sold commodity to the highest bidder. Increasingly they are looking for alternative mechanisms to resolving disputes. The public feels the same way about many of the other state institutions like the Police – increasingly they take the law into their own hands and avoid getting involved with the Police. The social fabric of the country is wearing very thin.

The public expects nothing but corrupt and venal behaviour from civil servants and manoeuvres round this by trying to establish patron/client relations.

Most people have become so used to corruption that they are unclear why it is dangerous to the state, although they know how it hurts them. Indonesians use a wide range of wry and jocular expressions for corruption, rarely employing the hard ethical language of “stealing” and “thief”.

### **Loss of Physical Capital**

The forests of Indonesia have almost gone destroyed through some of the grossest corruption practices anywhere; rivers are everywhere being despoiled and common property rights eroded, along with hillsides and valleys.

The national infrastructure, often put up below standard through bribery, is also eroding. Roads, railways, bridges, irrigation channels, and other important parts of the economic life of the country are in great need of upkeep, but corruption feeds on new plant and new buildings, not on maintenance. In the cities the failures in water supply and garbage collection are fuelled by corruption – as is pollution.

### **Loss of Human Capital**

Indonesians ability to look after themselves and their families and to add to the national wealth is diminished by corruption. Their increasing poverty has been deepened as the rich and powerful siphon off money that could be used for social services or increasing employment. Government increasingly charges for its services and its servants take a cut for themselves.

Indonesians ability to get its leaders to take a serious look at their situation is diminished by the pathetic behaviour of the DPR and DPRD's where the people who are meant to represent their interests are most interested in increasing personal income through corruption – even when it means consorting with criminals. In spite of decentralization there are few opportunities for the citizen to get participate in the processes that determine the rules by which their lives are governed – and in large part this is because the existing power holders do not want to give up any of that power which enables them to increase their own incomes.